



**Permanent Mission of Pakistan to the UN
Geneva**

**Statement by Pakistan, at the Subsidiary Body 2 of the Conference on
Disarmament, 06 August 2024**

Mr. Coordinator,

Let me begin by congratulating you on your appointment as the Coordinator for Subsidiary Body 2. I assure you of my delegation's constructive participation.

My delegation would also like to welcome the esteemed Ambassadors of Turkiye and the UK.

Mr. Coordinator,

Let me begin with the historical background of our topic today, which should inform our future work.

The SSOD I declared by consensus that “all States, in particular nuclear-weapon States, should consider as soon as possible various proposals designed to secure the avoidance of the use of nuclear weapons, the prevention of nuclear war and related objectives, where possible through international agreement, and thereby ensure that the survival of mankind is not endangered.”

Following SSOD I, several UN General Assembly resolutions requested that the CD commence negotiations on the prevention of nuclear war, and the question was put on the agenda of the Conference in 1983, as

part of what is now agenda item 1. Since 1984, the issue of “prevention of nuclear war, including all related matters” has featured as a standalone item on the CD’s agenda.

This splitting of the two items in 1984 was in response to calls to urgently address the threat of nuclear war. This was evident from the working papers that were submitted by several Member States in 1983-84 containing ideas on undertaking immediate work that could contribute to prevention of nuclear war.

Mr. Coordinator,

The notion of prevention of nuclear war is grounded in two interconnected streams with equal importance. The first one is nuclear disarmament as a means to achieve the larger objective of preventing a nuclear war. The second aspect is measures to prevent nuclear war until the elimination of nuclear weapons.

While the work on the first stream is being dealt in SB1, our efforts in this Subsidiary Body should be aimed at considering those genuine measures, which would contribute towards prevention of nuclear war.

I would like to briefly highlight some normative considerations of this agenda item:

First and foremost is the UN Charter’s first sentence “to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war”,

Second, the UN Charter’s prohibition on the threat or use of force,

Third, the UN Charter’s obligation on pacific settlement of disputes,

Fourth, SSOD-1’s principle of pursuing disarmament measures in such an equitable and balanced manner as to ensure that no individual State or group of States obtain advantages over others at any stage,

Fifth, SSOD-1’s principle of ensuring that security of all States is guaranteed at progressively lower levels of nuclear armaments,

And sixth, the fundamental principle emphasized unanimously by the General Assembly on several occasion, i.e. to save future generations from

the scourge of war, including with relation to this very topic to pursue appropriate and practical measures to prevent nuclear war.

Mr. Coordinator,

This backdrop of our agenda item 2 and its role also brings into perspective the efforts made by some to artificially transplant peripheral issues, instead of the core items that this body was designed to negotiate.

Certainly, considerations of preventing a nuclear war cannot be devoid of nuclear weapons and their associated components. It remains an objective reality that any nuclear war in the foreseeable future would not be fought with what is yet to be produced, but by what has already been produced, stockpiled, weaponized, deployed or reserved for such purposes.

It would be imperative and only logical that discussion of this dimension in this subsidiary body are grounded and based on this reality.

Mr. Coordinator,

When we look at the global security landscape, we note that over the past two decades, the international security order has progressively deteriorated. Today, this deterioration is evident in the ongoing conflicts, threats of use of nuclear weapons, rising geopolitical tensions and military expenditures, and weaponization of new and emerging technologies increasing risks of miscalculation and nuclear escalation.

No wonder, the UN Secretary General sounded the alarm bell that the prospects of a nuclear war are “back within the realm of possibility”.

As many in this body have been saying over the years, there is an inseparable link between prevention of nuclear war and prevention of war itself. This warrants a comprehensive approach in our work.

Similarly, the enhanced risks and triggers of a nuclear war both in the weapons domain and the geopolitical one require addressal.

The therapeutics of the problem would have to treat the disease rather than seek optics. Efforts to morph the work into cost free measures and

illusory pursuits detract from the larger goals of nuclear disarmament and prevention of nuclear war.

Mr. Coordinator,

In terms of structuring our work in this subsidiary body for next year, we believe that revival of adherence to fundamental principles in the normative domain, that I have already outlined, should form the first step.

In addition, I would like to highlight elements that may be examined in this Subsidiary Body as well as their contribution to prevention of nuclear war.

These are:

- First, Outlining commitments by States on renouncing the use or threat of use of force in international relations,
- Second, Examining security and military doctrines and their role in prevention of war, including nuclear war.
- Third, Considering the role of destabilizing weapons and technologies, which increase the risks of a nuclear war.
- Fourth, Considering policies and agreements on restraint measures,
- Fifth, Risk reduction matters and Confidence-building measures, in particular those aiming at the prevention of the outbreak of war, including nuclear war, by surprise, accident or miscalculation. This could include steps such as reducing operational readiness of nuclear weapons, and
- Sixth, Making progress on peaceful settlement of disputes in various regions, in particular those which carry risks of nuclear escalation.

Most of these elements have also been proposed before by a number of CD Member States in their working papers submitted under this agenda item. The question is whether these delegates have the will to adhere to their

own rationale and fundamental principles on which their approach was built in the subsidiary bodies established under this agenda item.

Mr. Coordinator,

Before I conclude, I would like to highlight my country's position on the issue of fissile material.

The only way this Subsidiary Body can address this matter is by adopting a comprehensive approach. Any discriminatory approach will continue to be opposed by Pakistan.

A comprehensive approach would include examination of the huge amount of fissile material stockpiles accumulated outside safeguards in different regions and the measures that are needed to address this issue, which could contribute towards prevention of a nuclear war.

We have also listened to the references made to the work done in the GGE and HLEPG.

Pakistan does not accept any conclusions or recommendations produced by both the GGE and the Expert preparatory Group. We reject their reports. It can in no way constitute the basis for further consideration of the fissile material issue by the international community.

Pakistan's consistent position on a Fissile Material Treaty, or FMT, is well known and remains unchanged. Our detailed views on various aspects of such a Treaty are also contained in the working paper (CD/2036) submitted in 2015.

In conclusion, Pakistan stands ready to work constructively in this body to advance our substantive work in pursuit of the broader objective of prevention of nuclear war under agenda item 2.

I thank you.
